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The emerging markets of Eastern Europe can be entered by several different
means.' License/franchise arrangements, joint ventures, acquisitions, and green-
field investments are just a few. Although the appropriate form for the investment
depends on the strategy of the particular investor, acquisitions and joint ventures
will continue to play important roles as entry vehicles. In Eastern Europe these
transactions generally take place within the framework of recently enacted priva-
tization laws.
Privatization is a highly political process, as the authorities are subject to
massive and conflicting public pressures. Consequently, politically charged issues
such as valuation and price of the local target company and foreign investor
commitments (principally investment, financing, technology, and employment)
are focal points in negotiations with those authorities. Environmental issues also
receive a great deal of attention in many transactions. The environmental legacy
of the Communist past is a reminder of the potentially staggering costs required
in the future to upgrade the environment in the region. With local environmental
laws and policies in a state of flux, particularly in the field of liability for and
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**The author presented an abridged version of this article at the International Bar Association
Second Annual Seminar on European Environmental Law in November 1992. The article draws
heavily on secondary source material and unofficial translations available to the author at the end of
November 1992. The rapid legal developments in the region may therefore have rendered obsolete
certain statutory references made in this article by the time of its publication. Nevertheless, the
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1. For purposes of this article, Eastern Europe encompasses the countries of central and eastern
Europe.
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cleanup of past pollution, perceived environmental risks must be addressed in
negotiations with the privatization authorities.
The following is a brief outline of the framework within which negotiations
with privatization authorities are conducted. The cornerstones are:
" the environmental legacy of the past, which underscores the importance of
addressing any environmental issues before the investment is made;
" the fluid legal infrastructure, which explains in part why those issues need
to be addressed in ad hoc negotiations with the relevant governmental author-
ities; and
* the process of privatization, which sheds some light on the difficulties many
foreign investors are experiencing in their negotiations with those authorities.
Although environmental issues frequently present themselves in negotiations
between privatization authorities and foreign investors, the details of negotiated
risk allocations are not readily available and depend to a great extent on the
particular circumstances. Nevertheless, this article includes a brief and very
general account of the principal issues. To illustrate some of the points made in
this article, the author uses examples drawn primarily from the Czech Republic.
I. The Environmental Legacy of the Past
The scale of Eastern Europe's environmental woes is formidable. After decades
of abuse, the air, water, and ground show scars that will last well into the next
century. Ill-judged irrigation, forestry, and farming policies have depleted water
supplies and have resulted in deforestation and soil erosion. The region's indus-
tries, with their wasteful use of "dirty" energy sources have produced pollution
of an unprecedented magnitude.
A healthy environment was not among the political values pursued by the
former regimes in Eastern Europe. In the absence of a free market, no mechanism
existed for factoring environmental considerations and other external costs into
the costs of production. Indeed, highly subsidized energy supplies from the former
USSR, the regional protector and watchdog, vitiated the pressure to conserve
energy and develop clean and internationally competitive technologies. Although
the economic impact from the environmental degradation, such as reduced pro-
ductivity, increased need for health-care services, reduced farm output, and spoil-
age of natural resources, is difficult to assess accurately, some have suggested
that the overall costs could be as much as 10-15 percent of annual GNP.2
The costs of significant remedial action are immense. Although the cost esti-
mates vary from study to study, many agree that governments in the region will
need to spend hundreds of billions of dollars to make production and use of energy
environmentally friendly, to clean up contaminated sites, and to introduce modern
waste treatment procedures. These costs are far beyond what countries in the
2. MERRITT, EASTERN EUROPE AND THE USSR-THE CHALLENGE OF FREEDOM 199 (1991).
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region are able to absorb, particularly as a number of competing infrastructural
and other needs make demands on their already strained economic resources.
Given the scale of the environmental problems in Eastern Europe and the
inability of host governments to fund the necessary remedial actions, investors
must take the environmental issues seriously. Against this backdrop it is not
surprising that many foreign investors assume that target sites are heavily polluted,
although in reality many sites probably have few, if any, problems of past pollu-
tion. In addition, many investors assume that local governments in financial straits
may be tempted to pass on environmental costs to the private sector, particularly
cash-rich foreign investors. The push by some countries, particularly Hungary,
Poland, and the members of the former Czech and Slovak Federated Republic
(CSFR), to join the European Community (EC) by the end of this century rein-
forces these assumptions as local environmental requirements in those countries
would have to harmonize with applicable environmental legislation within the
EC.
H. The Fluid Legal Infrastructure
The East European legal infrastructure is undergoing profound and rapid
changes. A smorgasbord of new legislation has emerged to substitute for anachro-
nistic Communist-era laws and regulations and to provide the necessary frame-
work for the planned transformation of the former command-economies into
market-based ones. Many countries in the region have enacted privatization laws
providing the general legal framework for transferring the vast state-owned sector
to private owners. A number of measures have also been taken to modernize local
laws in several areas, specifically in the accounting, taxation, and banking and
securities fields.3 Some countries have even introduced competition legislation
modeled after the body of EC law in the area.4
The speed at which these reforms are unfolding, the largely ad hoc ministerial
interpretations of the new body of law (implementing decrees are often issued
only after serious delays), and the unpredictable enforcement of those laws have
generated a fluid playing field lacking clear and predictable rules. Similar prob-
lems have developed in the environmental area, where consistent policies have
yet to be formulated.
In the absence of firm and reliable environmental policies foreign investors
have sought governmental indemnities to protect themselves against potential
environmental risks. Although in the course of negotiations with foreign investors
3. Recent revisions to the local accounting and tax regimes in the former CSFR, Hungary, and
Poland have brought these closer to international standards. In addition, Hungary and Poland have
reestablished a stock exchange and have introduced a regulatory infrastructure, including new securi-
ties legislation, needed to support the emerging capital markets.
4. Western-style competition laws have been enacted in the former CSFR, Hungary, and Poland,
and competition agencies have been set up to administer them.
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host governments have developed policy positions on environmental issues, the
ad hoc approach in addressing those issues is confusing.
In an attempt to allay foreign investor concerns in some areas, to deflate
investor expectations in others, and to enhance clarity and predictability in the
environmental field generally, the government of the Czech Republic recently
issued a policy resolution on the allocation of responsibility for preinvestment
environmental pollution. 5 Resolution 455, issued in June of 1992, addresses on-
site pollution, off-site pollution, and administrative and regulatory liability for
past violations of then applicable environmental laws, regulations, and permits.
The Resolution allocates to the investor/purchaser the responsibility for clean-
ing up preinvestment on-site pollution. However, the National Property Fund of
the Czech Republic, the governmental agency charged with executing sales of
state assets in accordance with governmentally approved privatization projects,
retains 50 percent of the purchase price to pay for on-site cleanup ordered by the
relevant governmental authority within one year of the investment.6 Resolution
455 further provides that the responsibility for preinvestment off-site pollution of
the environment shall remain with the state and will be settled through a state
environmental fund controlled by the Czech Ministry of Environment.7 According
to the Resolution, the investor/purchaser must bear administrative and regulatory
liability for past violations of then applicable environmental laws, regulations,
and permits.8
Notwithstanding philosophical reservations regarding the allocation of liability,
a number of uncertainties surrounding Resolution 455 tends to reinforce the ad
hoc approach. First, the requirement that cleanup be ordered makes it vital for
the foreign investor to agree with the relevant governmental authorities on a
remedial action plan before completing the investment/purchase (presumably on
the basis of a mutually acceptable environmental audit or site assessment). Second,
the monetary limitation may need to be reviewed in negotiations if the audit or
site assessment suggests cleanup costs will exceed that limitation. Third, the
Resolution fails to address investor concerns regarding liabilities to employees
and third parties for health conditions caused by preinvestment pollution. These
issues must be dealt with in preliminary negotiations. Overall, the Resolution fails
to provide foreign investors with long-term guidance, and does little to improve
clarity and predictability in the environmental area. Rather, Resolution 455 erects
obstacles to ad hoc negotiations and gives government negotiators little latitude
to compromise.
Looking ahead, East European legislators will find precedents and inspiration in
5. Resolution No. 455 of the government of the Czech Republic of June 24, 1992 [hereinafter
Resolution 455]. Resolution 455 will likely become law in the Czech Republic in 1993.
6. See id. § 11. 1.
7. See id. § 11.2.
8. See id. § 11.1.
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the growing body of EC environmental law. The association agreements recently
signed by the EC with the CSFR, Hungary, Poland, and Romania, respectively,
will expedite harmonization with EC legislation. Developments in the EC are
therefore relevant to actual and potential investors in Eastern Europe. The EC is
currently considering civil liability provisions that, if passed, could impose strict,
joint and several, and retroactive liability. 9
I. The Process of Privatization
Privatization is a cornerstone of the planned transition to a market economy.
Schemes for privatizing the vast state sector are constantly revised as the political
pressure to speed the process mounts. The panoply of different forms and tech-
niques includes small and large privatization, mass privatization by public offer-
ings, privatization by liquidation, sectoral privatization, and individually negoti-
ated sales (often after competitive bidding). A mixed bag of efficiency, fairness,
and fiscal considerations, which differ from country to country, limit the available
options. 0
Officials, advisors, and foreign investors have made the painful discovery that
privatization does not come easily. Although a large number of small businesses,
such as shops and restaurants, have been privatized, the transfer of medium- and
large-sized companies has not been as successful. Mass privatization programs
commenced or proposed in the former CSFR, Poland, and Russia are expected
to expedite the process.
Many countries in the region have created a ministry or agency to oversee the
privatization process and represent the state as the owner. However, the difficulty
of retaining experienced staff in a sufficient number to handle the monstrous
backlog of privatization projects/proposals contributes to making the process of
privatization a slow and winding road to private ownership. Excessive bureau-
cracy exacerbates the problem and fuels foreign investor frustration.
In an attempt to streamline the process of privatization, governments and priva-
tization authorities have issued guidelines for the preparation of privatization
proposals or disclosed the criteria employed in the approval process. " Similarly,
9. A proposal for an EC Council directive on civil liability for damage caused by waste was
originally submitted in 1989. That proposal was amended in significant respects, and a revised
proposal was submitted in 1991. See [Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 96,045. The EC
Commission recently adopted a communication on repairing damage to the environment. The green
paper considers a number of issues relating to the definition of environmental damage, types of and
limits on liability, and appropriate financial solutions. Public hearings are expected to be held in late
1993.
10. For a representative discussion of the necessary balancing of efficiency, fairness, and fiscal
considerations, see OECD ECONOMIC SURVEY CZECH AND SLOVAK FEDERAL REPUBLIc 53-60
(1991).
11. The Czech Ministry of Privatization has developed a set of guidelines for approving privatiza-
tion projects involving foreign investors. The most important criteria applied are the purchase price,
commitments to make additional investments, and the credibility of the foreign investor.
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standard acquisition agreements have been drafted and circulated to potential
foreign investors. 12 While standard agreements may help expedite ad hoc negotia-
tions with foreign investors, these agreements also present serious obstacles to
a speedy conclusion of transactions. In order for standard agreements to facilitate
transactions they need to be balanced and realistic. Too strong an adherence to
standardized agreements that do not meet these requirements can stifle negotia-
tions.
Although superseded by Resolution 455, the standard acquisition agreement
used by the National Property Fund of the Czech Republic illustrates how inflexi-
ble an agreement may be. That agreement, much adhered to by the Fund's repre-
sentatives in negotiations with foreign investors, indemnifies the investor/pur-
chaser against out-of-pocket costs to clean up preinvestment pollution at the
properties of the local target company. However, the agreement is silent on issues
of off-site contamination, health impacts on employees and third parties, and
administrative penalties and other liability arising from past violation of the then
applicable environmental laws and regulations.
Indemnity is restricted in several ways. One significant restriction is that the
cleanup must comply with applicable environmental laws and regulations. How-
ever, the agreement does not specify whether the laws are those applicable at the
time of closing of the investment or at the time of the cleanup. 13 Moreover, unless
an environmental audit is carried out prior to the investment and an agreement
is reached on allocating responsibility for identified pollution, only "hidden"
pollution, which could not have been discovered in an audit and which is not
known to the investor, is covered. Other limitations, such as a monetary cap and
temporal compliance requirements are imposed on the investor.
The hazy contours of the standard form indemnity reinforces the ad hoc ap-
proach by requiring the Fund and the foreign investor to address the uncertainties
in negotiations. Aside from placing foreign investors on notice of the monetary
and time limits, the standard agreement does little to clarify the government's
position on environmental issues. A revised version of the agreement may be
circulated, prompted by Resolution 455.
The large number of transactions processed by the government authorities not
only makes it desirable to streamline procedures, but also contains the government
negotiators' flexibility. The risk of making precedent-setting concessions to for-
eign investors is often cited as a rationale for limiting environmental indemnifica-
tion.
The privatization process is highly politicized and the quantum of governmental
concessions, including in the environmental field, depends largely on the impor-
12. The standard acquisition agreement used by the National Property Fund of the Czech Republic
is an example. The agreement, which is widely used as a basis for negotiations, can be obtained
through the National Property Fund or through many legal counsels operating in Prague.
13. See id. § 13.2.
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tance of the transaction to the local market. Much can be negotiated with the
relevant governmental authorities if the proposal brings substantial benefits to the
host country, such as capital for necessary investments, state-of-the-art technol-
ogy, managerial skills, global market access, and local employment. Political
leaders recognize that foreign investment will play a pivotal role in restructuring
the largely monolithic local industry and increasing the international competitive-
ness of locally manufactured or provided products and services. Commitments
by the foreign investor in one or more of these areas could greatly facilitate
concessions by the host government in the environmental field.
IV. Negotiated Indemnities
The ad hoc approach to environmental cleanup and liability renders any attempt
to define the market practice in the field of indemnities an exercise in futility. The
details of negotiated transactions are not readily available and depend largely on
the particular circumstances relevant to those transactions. Therefore, any account
of the current practice has to be put in general terms.
Host governments have provided indemnities to address foreign investor con-
cerns, specifically against liability for on-site and off-site preinvestment pollution,
against liability to employees and third parties for health problems caused by such
pollution, and against administrative or similar penalties or liabilities for past
violations of then applicable environmental laws and regulations. The indemnities
have, however, been limited in a number of significant respects, including in time
and amount.
Not surprisingly, the issue of preinvestment on-site pollution is often a focal
point in negotiations.14 Despite its significance, the issue should be relatively easy
to resolve once the pollution has been identified and the cleanup costs quantified.
For this purpose, privatization legislation in some countries mandates that envi-
ronmental audits or site assessments be conducted in connection with the privatiza-
tion of local companies, 15 and in other countries such audits are standard practice. 6
In either case the investigation, often paid for by the company to be privatized and
conducted by an independent consultant under the supervision of the privatization
14. The costs of controlling current and future discharges into the air, water, and soil may be
large, but are more predictable than costs and liabilities associated with past pollution. Thus, the costs
for adding pollution control equipment, changing process technology, and switching energy and raw
material feedstocks are normally accounted for by the foreign investors in their investment analyses
and therefore impact on the price the investors are prepared to pay for the target company.
15. See, e.g., the former CSFR Law No. 92/1991 on the Condition of Transfer of State Property
to Other Persons, para. 6a, amended by Law No. 92/1992.
16. For example, in Poland, art. 20 para. 1 of the State Enterprise Privatization Act of July 13,
1990, strictly interpreted, does not require an environmental audit or site assessment to be conducted.
Nevertheless, a summary site assessment is often conducted in connection with the preprivatization
legal and financial study required for companies put up for privatization.
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ministry, is cursory. ' 7 The investor may of course follow up the initial investiga-
tion with a more detailed examination, usually at the investor's own expense.
Host governments and foreign investors have agreed to dedicate a portion of
the purchase price to on-site cleanup, usually a specific high-end West European
standard. One procedure that has been used in some transactions is to place the
dedicated portion of the purchase price in a restricted escrow account, which may
be drawn on by the foreign investor as the agreed site remediation progresses."8
In some cases foreign investors have been asked to make matching contributions
to ensure that the cleanup is conducted in a cost-efficient manner.' 9
From the foreign investor's perspective, an agreement to meet Western envi-
ronmental standards at the expense of the host government is clearly ideal. It
allows the investor to adjust early to future legislation certain to come and provides
an opportunity for a clean start. Additionally, it obviates the need to index any
agreed monetary limitation to the indemnity to account for actual increases in
local labor costs, which will likely increase more rapidly than in Western Europe
and therefore quickly may "consume" any room for indemnification.
Although cleanup generally is in the interest of the host government, immediate
cleanup to Western standards may not be. The ad hoc approach carries the risk
that agreements with foreign investors reflect investor concerns rather than a
consistent governmental policy. Moreover, scarce resources available for cleanup
may be diverted to sites and problems that, relatively speaking, pose no real or
immediate threat to health or the environment.20
The potential consequences of past pollution that has migrated, or that may in
the future migrate, off-site present particularly difficult problems. Environmental
audits and site assessments can identify on-site problems with a fair degree of
accuracy. Off-site environmental problems are more difficult to predict and can
appear long after the investment is made. These problems may include adverse
effects on the environment (such as contamination of groundwater or drinking
water supplies) and public health (such as respiratory diseases and cancers) and
may attract municipal enforcement actions and third-party claims.2
Employee health is a frequently overlooked issue. As with liability for off-site
pollution, the potential exposure to claims from employees who in the past have
been exposed to hazardous substances is difficult to quantify. A review of the
17. The environmental consultant is expected to review the company's history of production, its
compliance record, and its present environmental management practices, and also to make a visual
site inspection. However, the investigation will generally not involve soil, air, or water sampling.
See BELL & KOLAJA, CAPITAL PRIVATIZATION AND THE MANAGEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY
ISSUES IN POLAND 10-12 (1992).
18. Id. at 22-23.
19. Id. at 31.
20. Id. at 26.
21. As discussed, Resolution 455, supra note 5, places responsibility on the state for adverse
effects on the off-site environment caused by preinvestment activities. It is not clear, however, that
this allocation applies also to third-party claims.
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manufacturing processes employed in the past may be sufficient to allay any
health-related concern a foreign investor has. Nevertheless, a prudent investor
should require the employees of the target company to undergo medical examina-
tions to determine their health at the time of the investment.
Much of Eastern Europe's environmental degradation results from the permis-
sive environmental standards of the now defunct Communist system. Future
legislation, therefore, will have to impose strict liability, requiring cleanup of
polluted sites whether or not applicable environmental laws were violated at the
time of the polluting discharge. Much pollution can also be attributed to the often
lax enforcement of applicable environmental laws and regulations. Although it
may be possible for foreign investors to review the past compliance record of a
target company, it may be difficult to draw any reliable conclusions from it.2 2 A
prudent investor should ask the host government for assurances that administrative
penalties and similar liabilities for past violations of then applicable environmental
laws and regulations will not be imposed after the investment is made.
Host governments have provided limited indemnities against liabilities associ-
ated with off-site environmental pollution and employee health, and have waived
their rights to impose administrative penalties and similar liabilities for past viola-
tions of the then applicable environmental laws and regulations. At the same
time, host governments seek to limit their indemnities by introducing monetary
thresholds, caps, time bars, and similar restrictions. Any such limitation transfers
liability to the foreign investor and its acceptability depends in part on the ability
of the foreign investor to quantify that exposure. For example, if a thorough and
reliable environmental audit or site assessment has estimated the cleanup costs
for identified on-site pollution, the exposure can be dealt with in the pricing of the
transaction should the estimated costs exceed the proposed limitation. However,
monetary caps, time bars, and similar limitations in the context of off-site environ-
mental pollution or employee health are bound to pose significant problems to
foreign investors who would expect virtually unlimited indemnities in these areas.
Resolution 455 provides foreign investors in the Czech Republic with some ammu-
nition (for example, governmental recognition that responsibility rests with the
state) and should facilitate negotiation of extensive indemnities in these areas.23
The negotiation of indemnities is a difficult enough exercise in Western Europe
and the United States, and there is little reason to expect it to be easier in Eastern
Europe where the exposure is so much greater. To avoid confronting the host
government over indemnities, some foreign investors seek to structure the invest-
ment as an assets transaction, with the assumption that liabilities not expressly
assumed by the investor will stay with the seller. Specifically, an investor may
22. Records have not always been properly maintained and it is difficult to assess whether accurate
entries were made at the time. In addition, the absence of past enforcement actions is no indication
of compliance, but rather is a reflection of lax enforcement.
23. See Resolution 455, supra note 5, § 11.2.
FALL 1993
792 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
propose renting rather than purchasing real property used by the local target
company as a means of avoiding exposure to environmental liabilities.24
Although renting rather than buying real property might insulate the investor
from successor responsibility for the environmental neglect of the past, it
equally well might not provide the intended protection. As indicated above,
the awesome size of the environmental cleanup bill may tempt cash-strapped
host governments to unload some of the environmental costs onto the private
sector, particularly onto cash-rich foreign investors. The appropriate response
to this uncertainty would seem to be to address the environmental issues at
the time of investment rather than relying on legal niceties that may not be
understood by local courts and authorities and that may be superseded by the
pressures of economic reality.
V. Concluding Remarks
The rapidly changing legal landscape of Eastern Europe and the mammoth
privatization programs under way contribute to making foreign investments a
challenging task. The potentially staggering costs of environmental cleanup and
liability add to the complexity, but underscore the necessity of adequately ad-
dressing these issues in negotiations with the appropriate governmental authorities
before investing. Although negotiations with host governments are difficult at
times, a few observations can be made:
* With no firm and reliable policy in the environmental area currently avail-
able, at least in theory virtually anything is negotiable.
" The privatization process is a political one. The quantum of governmental
concessions on environmental concerns depends to a great extent on the
importance of the proposed transaction to the local market.
* Host governments are reluctant to provide indemnities without the benefit
of an environmental audit or site assessment. Since much of the positioning
in negotiations can be attributed to uncertainty of the magnitude of environ-
mental problems, an early environmental audit or site assessment could
substantially facilitate negotiations. An audit or assessment should preferably
apply high-end Western standards to account for expected changes in local
environmental standards, and should be conducted by an independent or
neutral audit firm to secure acceptability with the host government. The audit
should also be coordinated with the relevant local and central environmental
authorities to forestall bureaucratic delays at the privatization authority,
which often does not possess environmental expertise.
24. A rental arrangement may not be acceptable to the privatization authorities. Because they do
not have the resources to administer real property, for administrative reasons they would rather see
the entire target company privatized. There are a number of ways to deal with this reluctance, including
the establishment of a separate real estate company to be taken by other investors, and perhaps the
employees.
VOL. 27, NO. 3
EASTERN EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 793
Although environmental issues may present significant obstacles in many trans-
actions, these issues must be put in perspective. Not even the broadest environ-
mental indemnity can transform a shaky investment proposal into a viable proposi-
tion. As pointed out in a recently published survey of foreign investment in
Eastern Europe, political stability, a favorable development of local markets, and
increased access to export markets are even more important to foreign investors. 25
Although it is clear that local governments bear the ultimate responsibility for the
developments of their countries, foreign governments and international organiza-
tions could play an important role in promoting and facilitating much-needed
foreign investment into Eastern Europe.26
25. The survey was conducted during the summer of 1992 by the Economist Intelligence Unit,
Vienna, Austria, and Creditanstalt, a leading Austrian bank.
26. For a general discussion of the impact of EC import restrictions on investments in Eastern
Europe, see Geoffrey D. Oliver & Erwin P. Eichmann, European Community Restrictions on Imports
from Central and Eastern Europe: The Impact on Western Investors, 22 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
721 (1991).
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